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CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: PERCEPTIONS
ON TOLLING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
[W]ith the first-born safely submerged and "sleeping" from the age
of two, the other Troop members began to evolve one by one and
to undergo the abuse for her. The evolution of yet other selves in
effect buried the first-born child deeper over the years.'
Truddi Chase was sexually abused by her stepfather from the age of two
until the age of sixteen.2 She has not filed a complaint against her abuser,
nor does she intend to. Essentially she no longer exists. Truddi Chase's
body is a shelter for her inner world of ninety-two personalities3 that devel-
oped over forty years, enabling her to cope with the emotional and physical
trauma that arises from sexual abuse.4
Like Truddi Chase, many sexually abused children are not aware of their
psychological problems until they become adults.5 While Truddi Chase
chose to contribute to the medical profession's understanding and treatment
of adult victims of incest, other victims of this abuse decide to sue their
abusers in court. However, these lawsuits are often dismissed on procedural
grounds6 and the victims never receive their day in court.
Statutes of limitations are imposed on both civil and criminal actions to
assist the courts in their pursuit of the truth by barring stale claims and to
1. Robert A. Phillips, Jr., Introduction and Author's Note to THE TROOPS FOR TRUDDI
CHASE, WHEN RABBIT HowLs at xx (1987). Dr. Robert A. Phillips, Jr., Ph.D., served as the
psychotherapist for a woman who retained ninety-two personalities within her own mind. The
book is a factual documentation of Dr. Phillips's treatment of the woman; it is written by the
various personalities who make up the person known as Truddi Chase. Id. at xxiv-xxv (1987).
2. Id. at xiii.
3. Id. at xxiv. Multiple personalities often occur in men and women who have exper-
ienced severe and repeated sexual and physical abuse over a significant period of time. Id. at
xi. This reference to the development of multiple personalities is not meant to serve as the sole
example of the effects of childhood sexual abuse, instead it is a rather extreme result that a
victim may suffer. For purposes of this Comment, the example of Truddi Chase's multiple
personalities will be used only intermittently while other psychological effects of victims of
childhood sexual abuse that have opted to sue the abuser will be thoroughly explored.
4. Id. at xiii.
5. Id. at xi-xii.
6. Because the abusive act has occurred years before, a victim of incest is subject to a
limited time in which a civil claim against the abuser may be filed. The statutes of limitations
for similar civil actions, or civil actions in general, vary from state to state. See infra notes II -
24 and acompanying text.
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protect potential defendants from the protracted fear of litigation." Numer-
ous courts have addressed policy concerns in limiting the time to bring cer-
tain tort claims, namely claims of intentional infliction of emotional harm.'
These policies: 1) question whether relevant evidence will become stale, lost,
or destroyed; 2) recognize the need for judicial economy; 3) address "the
possibility of continuing 'blackmail' by potential plaintiffs"; 4) perceive an
unfairness to potential defendants who may be required to defend themselves
long after the alleged act; and 5) acknowledge the need for "self-reformation
by potential defendants."9 In deciding whether to allow a plaintiff's claim to
proceed despite the lapse of the statute of limitations, the court will balance
the harm to the plaintiff of being denied a remedy against the harm to the
defendant of having to defend against old claims."1
Statutes of limitations for torts ordinarily require an action for personal
injuries to be brought within a specified period after the cause of action has
accrued, usually from one to six years." Traditionally, the cause of action
accrues 12 at the time of the injury.' 3 However, the term "accrue" is not
usually defined in the relevant statute and consequently is subject to judicial
interpretation.' 4 By neglecting to define accrue, traditional tort statutes of
limitations fail to address two problems: "the medical impossibility of deter-
mining the date of injury, even in retrospect... [and] the legal impossibility
of maintaining an action for an injury inherently incapable of discovery
within the limitation period."' 5 The response to these problems is a discov-
7. See Annotation, 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Liebig v.
Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316,
320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Wash. 1986);
Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
9. See James W. Harshaw III, Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitutionality of
Short Statutes of Limitations for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 753
(1989).
10. See Annotation, supra note 7, § 18 (1970).
11. For a brief state-by-state survey, see Franceis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of
Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM
416 app., at 438-40 (1981).
12. The term "accrue" refers to the date that the damage is sustained and not the date
when the causes which ultimately produce injury are set in motion. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 20-21 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See Susan D. Glimcher, Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent
Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Prr. L. REV. 501, 501 (1982). This is partic-
ularly true because normally "the injury immediately follows a defendant's tortious conduct
and damages are easily established." Id.
14. Thomas W. Thrash & A. Russell Blank, Latent Injuries and the Statute of Limita-
tions: A New Rule Emerges in Georgia, 19 GA. ST. B.J., Aug. 1982, at 12; Note, Developments
in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950).
15. Glimcher, supra note 13, at 502.
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ery rule 16 whereby the statute of limitations does not commence until a Vic-
tim discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the injury.' 7
An application of this discovery rule to claims of incestuous abuse' 8 poses
a peculiar problem to victims, courts, and legislatures alike. The circum-
stances of the abuse and the nature of the related psychological injuries often
prevent the victim from recognizing her' 9 injuries and their cause until after
16. The term "discovery rule" is used interchangeably with the term "delayed discovery
rule." For a discussion of the delayed discovery rule, see Melissa G. Salten, Note, Statutes of
Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189,
213 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1949). Petitioner was diagnosed
with silicosis only a year before fling suit in which he alleged that he contacted the disease in
the course of his employment and there was no suggestion that he should have been aware of
his condition at an earlier date. The court held that the failure to diagnose the petitioner's
lung disease, whose symptoms were not yet apparent, did not constitute a waiver of his right to
sue. Id.
18. Although sexually abusive assailants may include step-fathers, mothers' boyfriends,
babysitters, neighbors, other family acquaintances, strangers, and people in authority, family
members are the most frequent perpetrators of sexual abuse. See Jeffery B. Bryer et al., Child-
hood Sexual and Physical Abuse as Factors in Adult Psychiatric Illness, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1426, 1427 (1987); Gloria A. Bachmann et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse and the
Consequences in Adult Women, 71 OsmrETmics & GYNECOLOGY 631, 633 (1988). For this
reason, the effects of sexual abuse on children will be discussed largely in regard to studies of
incestuous abuse.
The likelihood that the abuser is a family member often has a direct relationship to the
victim's age. For example, "children under the age eleven are more likely to be sexually
abused by a family member than are adolescents." Bachmann, supra, at 633. Conversely, after
the age of eleven, the percentage of cases involving a family member drops dramatically. Id. at
633-34.
Incest is most likely to occur in a family where the supremacy of the father is pronounced,
and the subordination of the mother is equally as noticeable. Salten, supra note 16, at 193; see
also JUDITH L. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 54-57, 63 (1981). Nevertheless, sexual
abuse has no relation to class, occupational status, urban or rural residency, or ethnicity.
Bachmann, supra, at 634. In the incestuous family, the father typically believes strongly in the
male privilege, while the mother is frequently overburdened with pregnancy and child care
responsibilities. Salten, supra note 16, at 195; see also Bachmann, supra, at 635.
"The sexually abused child is usually the eldest daughter, who, by the age of eight or nine,
has a major responsibility for family household and child-rearing tasks." Id. at 635; see also
Margaret T. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 609, 613-14 (1983). Consequently, the eldest daughter recognizes her mother's relatively
weak position in the family and does not perceive her as a dependable ally. Salten, supra note
16, at 195. On the other hand, the mother is often reluctant to intervene in the incestuous
relationship if it is known to her because it would result in her own forced undertaking of
sexual services to satisfy the abusive father's expectations, which he demands from the daugh-
ter. Id. at 194. "In order to protect her marriage, the mother indicates unequivocally that her
husband's needs take priority over her daughter's and, therefore, she makes no attempt to stop
the incestuous abuse." Allen, supra, at 615.
19. For purposes of this Comment, the incest victim will be referred to as a member of the
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the occurrence of the last incestuous incident.2" In such cases, a cause of
action might not be filed until well beyond the statutory time limit, requiring
the court to dismiss the complaint.2 ' To remedy the unfair dismissal of such
inherently offensive claims,22 courts and legislatures must implement the
policies underlying statutes of limitations2 3 without violating the constitu-
female gender, which appears to be the prevalent gender in incestuous abuse cases in light of
the available literature. Studies reveal that boys are abused far less often than girls. HERMAN,
supra note 18, at 14. For example, one clinical social worker found that 30% of the female
population and 10% of the male population had been sexually abused. Laurie C. Kilgore,
Effect of Early Childhood Sexual Abuse on Self and Ego Development, 1988 Soc. CASEWORK:
J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 224, 224.
The reference to the female gender is not intended to ignore incestuously victimized males or
suggest that their hidden injuries are undeserving of civil remedies. In fact, a recent compara-
tive study addresses the association between the male gender and molestation history. See
generally John Briere et al., Symptomatology in Men Who Were Molested As Children: A Com-
parison Study, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 457 (1988).
Another study suggests that females under the age of 18 are treated for sexual abuse more
often than males of the same age because of a greater number of genital injuries to young
females. See Bachmann, supra note 18, at 633.
20. Salten, supra note 16, at 191.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. However, it also provides that if a court considers matters presented
outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The nature of incestuous abuse actions often compels the
courts to consider matters outside the pleading, therefore prompting the motion for summary
judgment. For this reason, this Comment will consider the defendant's challenge to an inces-
tuous abuse complaint as a motion for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment may be denied when the court determines that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The introduction of medical testimony in
childhood sexual abuse cases allows the adult plaintiff to establish genuine issues of material
fact as to when she discovered the abuse and its causal connection to her psychological disor-
ders and, therefore, precludes a summary judgment motion. See Hildebrand v. Hildebrand,
736 F. Supp. 1512, 1524 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (deposition testimony revealed that plaintiff's psy-
chologist determined that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder); Johnson v. John-
son, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (affidavit filed by plaintiff's therapist contained
diagnosis of multiple personality disorder); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (reviewing treatment notes of plaintiff's psychologist and affidavit submitted
by another psychologist who had no contact with the plaintiff); Hammer v. Hammer, 418
N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (accepting and considering an affidavit of the plaintiff's
psychological counselor).
22. Victims of incest are often subject to sadistic sexual abuse, brutal beatings, and emo-
tional torment. Some abusers minimize the physical abuse by limiting their behavior to erotic
touching or fondling of genitals, both of which result in severe emotional damage to the victim.
Phillips, supra note 1, at xi-xii.
23. For a discussion of other policy arguments that courts address, see Harshaw, supra
note 9 and accompanying text. Similar policy considerations are reviewed by legislatures wish-
ing to extend the statutes of limitations for such tort claims.
In addition to the policy concerns, evidentiary problems require the use of statutes of limita-
tions despite the offensive nature of the tortious act. For example, a critical witness may have
died or it may be impossible to locate the witness by the time the action is brought; witnesses'
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tional rights of potential litigants.24
Recently, a number of courts have addressed incestuous abuse claims filed
long after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Some jurisdictions
construe the statute literally and hold that the action is barred,2 5 despite the
fact that the victim only recently discovered that the conduct was tortious.
Other courts, however, permit such tort actions to overcome the obstacle of
time limitations statutes by adopting a delayed discovery rule-a judicially
constructed exception to the strict time limitation.26 Consequently, the dis-
position of each incestuous abuse complaint rests on how a court construes
the statute of limitations in light of the allegations presented,' particularly
memories may fade or be colored by intervening events and experiences; and physical evidence
may be overlooked at the time of the alleged wrong or misplaced at some point thereafter.
Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Wash. 1986) (citing Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 634
(Wash. 1969)).
24. Regardless of the typical policy arguments and possible evidentiary problems involved
in mandating statutes of limitations, it is arguable that the statutory time limits imposed on
such incestuous abuse actions are a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. For an extensive evaluation of the constitutional issues involved, see generally
Harshaw, supra note 9.
The constitutional argument essentially offers the reasoning of three United States Supreme
Court cases which acknowledges the need to address unique factors in determining the consti-
tutional validity of a time limitation statute, while providing courts with the ability to recog-
nize the special impact of such circumstances on the individual involved and her subsequent
inability to redress the wrongs earlier. Id. at 755. As such, this judicial acknowledgment of
such extraordinary factors should require heightened scrutiny when evaluating the constitu-
tional validity of tort statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse claims because, otherwise,
states that impose one statute of limitations for personal injuries treat dissimilarly situated
people similarly. Id. For instance, a plaintiff sexually abused as a child is given the same
amount of time to file her claim as a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident.
While these constitutional issues are indeed relevant to the development of new policies
addressing incestuous abuse actions, this Comment focuses on the methods by which the
courts and legislatures can modify the unfair situation before the issue faces time-consuming
litigation on the constitutional questions.
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1987); DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); E.W. v. D.C.H., 745 P.2d 817, 821 (Mont. 1988); Tyson, 727 P.2d at
230; Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314, 317 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
26. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 763 F. Supp. 1512, 1517-18 (S.D. Ind. 1990);
Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369-70 (N.D. I11. 1988); Mary D. v. John D., 216
Cal. App. 3d 285, 294 (1989); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. CT. App. Div. 1990); Osland v. Osland,
442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987).
In applying the delayed discovery rule to the area of tort law, these courts have been guided
by the principle that plaintiffs should be put on notice before their claims are barred by the
passage of time. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak, 714 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1983). For a general
discussion on the policy of delayed discovery as construed by courts, see Salten, supra note 16,
at 206-13.
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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focusing on how and when the cause of action was recognized. The court
then takes into account, if applicable, the possibility that professional inter-
vention induced the victim to discover her psychological injury and its most
likely cause.28
In 1986, the Washington Supreme Court decided the seminal case in the
application of the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse actions.29 This
Comment begins with a brief discussion of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Tyson v. Tyson and the subsequent enactment of statutes affecting the
commencement of actions based upon childhood sexual abuse. The Com-
ment then compares the effect of Tyson on the developing case law in Cali-
fornia, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Washington, and Wisconsin-all of which have addressed similar issues in
recent years. It then discusses the different results in some jurisdictions
based on policy considerations and the unique facts of each case.
Section II of this Comment discusses the need to establish a uniform ap-
proach to the discovery rule in incest cases. In doing so, this Comment fo-
cuses on the need for a consistent application of expert clinicians testimony
as an impartial, reasonable basis for construing the date of discovery for
legal purposes. By establishing a reliable method of assessing an adult vic-
tim's psychological injuries, courts can effectively maintain fundamental
fairness by allowing tort claims for childhood sexual abuse to overcome an
otherwise applicable time restriction. The Comment also analyzes the ca-
pacity of legislative bodies to promulgate extensions of statutes of limitations
for actions based on sexual abuse of a child.3° This Comment concludes by
suggesting that these two methods provide an equitable preservation of a
victim's potential remedy.3'
I. TYSON V. TYSON
A case from the Washington Supreme Court offers two distinct views on
the application of the discovery rule to childhood abuse cases. In Tyson v.
Tyson, a2 the majority refused to apply a discovery rule to an incestuous
abuse claim without objective, verifiable evidence of the original wrongful
act. The majority concluded that methods of investigation by treating psy-
28. Allen, supra note 18, at 631.
29. Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
30. For a discussion of the constitutionality of short statutes of limitations, see Harshaw,
supra note 9, at 766.
31. For a comprehensive exposition on the victim's remedy, see Salten, supra note 16, at
220.
32. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
33. Id. at 229.
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chologists and psychiatrists are primarily subjective, are not based on physi-
cally observable evidence, and therefore, provide no means of independently
corroborating a victim's allegations.34 Conversely, the dissent highlighted
the inequity of denying adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse a legal
remedy35 and credited mental health care professionals with the ability to
reliably assist the trier of fact in search of the truth.36
The 5-4 decision in Tyson and the response by the Washington legisla-
ture37 two years earlier reveal that the issue of applying a delayed discovery
rule to a complaint filed by an adult survivor of child sexual abuse remains
essentially unresolved. After the Washington Supreme Court stated that the
delayed discovery rule is indeed applicable "when the risk of stale claims is
outweighed by the unfairness of precluding justified causes of action," it de-
cided that it is not proper to allow the claim to proceed when the alleged acts
can not be independently verified, and rests solely on the vague recollection
of the victim. 38 In 1988, however, the Washington legislature amended the
personal injury statute of limitations to provide for the tolling of time limita-
tion statutes in incestuous abuse cases. 39 While Tyson has effectively been
superseded by the statute, it is important to note that not all jurisdictions
34. Id.
35. Id. at 235 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
37. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1991) (amending WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 to clarify any possible confusion that may exist in interpreting the
statute of limitations provisions for child sexual abuse civil actions in § 4.16.190, which pro-
vides that the time limit for commencement of civil actions is tolled until the child reaches the
age of eighteen).
38. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 228-29.
39. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(1) (West Supp. 1991), states in pertinent part:
All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for
recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be
commenced within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condi-
tion, or three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have dis-
covered that the injury or condition was caused by said act, whichever period expires
later. Provided, that the limit for commencement of an action under this action is
tolled for a child until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.
Id.
This legislation was initiated primarily by Patti Barton, a 35-year-old woman who was sexu-
ally abused for five years beginning when she was five and who subsequently blocked the mem-
ories for 29 years until she sought counseling for her failing marriage. In light of the 1986
Tyson decision, however, Mrs. Barton had no legal recourse against her abuser for money
damages resulting from her costly psychotherapy. In 1987, she and her husband pioneered the
Washington legislation, which essentially sets the statute of limitations in motion at the time
the victim realized she had been abused as a child rather than at the time the victim turned 18.
See Annabel Lund, Victim's Bill Puts Abusers on Notice, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Apr. 5, 1989, at 2.
For a discussion of the impact of this legislation on other states, see infra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text.
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have adopted a similar statute.'
In Tyson, the plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of sexual abuse be-
tween 1960 and 1969; the suit was filed in 1983."' The twenty-six-year-old
complainant further alleged that the sexual assaults caused her to suppress
all memories of the acts until 1983 when she entered psychological therapy,
which triggered her knowledge of the sexual abuse and her recognition that
the abuse caused the emotional problems she experienced as an adult.42 The
court stated that the discovery rule only applied when the objective nature of
the evidence provides substantial certainty that the facts can be fairly deter-
mined despite the considerable length of time that has passed since the al-
leged acts occurred.43 In deciding whether to apply a delayed discovery rule
to this situation, the court distinguished sexual abuse cases from medical
malpractice actions, which present "objective evidence, often accompanied
by medical diagnosis,"'  and concluded that application of a delayed discov-
ery rule to an incestuous abuse action was inappropriate because the alleged
acts were based solely on the purported recollection of the events repressed
from the plaintiff's consciousness for over thirteen years.45
The Tyson majority relied primarily on a single law review article" that
questions the imprecise and subjective nature of psychology and psychia-
try.47 The author of that article suggests that the psychoanalyst, in the
course of therapy, takes numerous steps away from discovering what really
happened to the victim. 48 For instance, if the patient reports her memories
40. Presently, only the California, Missouri, Montana, and Vermont legislatures have
adopted similar statutes of limitations for injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1991), which reads:
(a) In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the
date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or
illness after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever occurs
later.
Id.; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216
(1991); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Supp. 1991). All these enactments have retroactive
applicability. See infra text accompanying note 62.
41. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 229.
44. Id. at 228.
45. Id. at 228-29. Although it was suggested that the subjectivity of the plaintiff's claim
could be eliminated at trial through the testimony of the psychologists treating her, the court
rejected the validity of such testimony. Id. at 229.
46. Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60
WASH. L. REV. 331 (1985).
47. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229.
48. Wesson, supra note 46, at 334-36.
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and dreams in the chaotic way in which they first come into her mind, then
the analyst is required to supply a critical organizing principle to make sense
of the report.49 The psychoanalyst's interpretation of the patient's narrative
unwittingly influences her to experience memories which do not accurately
correspond to her history but fit into the analyst's understanding of the
event.50 The majority in Tyson adhered to the notion that the psychoana-
lytic process can result in a distortion of the truth when reconstructing the
events of the patient's past life.5" They also reasoned that in a legal proceed-
ing which presents expert testimony by a psychologist or psychiatrist, the
trier of fact is precluded from assuming that the psychoanalysis produced an
accurate account of the events of the individual's past.52
The Tyson dissent vehemently opposed the majority's "perception of the
history, purpose, and prior application of the discovery rule,"53 their dis-
creditation of mental health care professionals as expert witnesses, 4 and
their disregard for the enormity of the problem of childhood sexual abuse.55
The dissent recognized the expansion of the discovery rule in other con-
texts56 and reasoned that fundamental fairness, rather than availability of
objective evidence, is the linchpin of the discovery rule.5 7 In so doing, the
dissent framed the issue to be whether the court should apply the discovery
rule only when the victim's cause of action is otherwise time-barred.58 The
dissent found the majority's focus on possible evidentiary problems-those a
plaintiff might encounter at trial in convincing the trier of fact of the reason-
ableness of the late discovery in incestuous abuse-irrelevant.59
The dissent also supported the role of the psychotherapist expert in assist-
ing the trier of fact's determination of the time of discovery.6° It suggested
that society and the court have an obligation to understand how and why
repression occurs, because this understanding will encourage the courts to
49. Id. at 335.
50. Id.
51. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229.
52. Id. at 229.
53. Id. at 230 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 232 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 233-34 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 231. The dissent cited White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 93 P.2d 687 (Wash.
1985) (latent occupational disease); Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 663 P.2d 473 (Wash.
1983) (products liability); Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969) (medical malpractice);
Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 585 P.2d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (libel); and Kundahl v. Barnett,
486 P.2d 1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (professional malpractice).
57. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Pearson, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Pearson, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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provide an equitable remedy to adult victims by applying a delayed discov-
ery rule.6'
The statutory amendment in Washington exemplifies society's growing
concern for victims of childhood sexual abuse and their legal recourse, or
lack thereof. Traditionally, statutes of limitations read: "actions for injuries
to the person shall be commenced and sued within [x] years after the cause
of action shall accrue, and not after."62 The respective tolling statutes may
also provide, for example, that if a person entitled to bring an action is a
minor, insane, or imprisoned on a criminal charge, the action will not com-
mence until [x] years after the disability ceases. 63 Further modifications of
special limitation statutes to include incestuous abuse suggest that legisla-
tures are reviving civil common law actions for sexual molestation which
otherwise are barred because the statute of limitations has run.
64
Without child molestation statutes,6 5 similar relief in childhood sexual
abuse cases can still be rendered by a broad reading of the statute of limita-
tions.66 However, these same statutes of limitations may be construed nar-
rowly, and without the benefit of a child molestation statute, the discovery
rule is inapplicable.67 Consequently, the reasoning of both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Tyson has a strong impact on decisions in many juris-
dictions where the question of how to interpret the applicable statute of limi-
61. Id. at 234-35 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (1985). See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
101 (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260, § 2A (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 511
(Supp. 1990).
63. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-515(a) (1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-201(a) (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 260, § 7 (1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.5851; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1974);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-19 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-22 (Supp. 1991); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 551(a) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.16(1) (West 1983).
64. Liebig v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 574, 574-75 (Ct. App. 1989) (upholding the
legislative enactment which retroactively made all civil actions for claims involving childhood
sexual abuse subject to a three-year period as opposed to the one-year period after reaching the
age of majority in which to bring all other tort actions).
65. For a list of those jurisdictions which have enacted specific child molestation statutes,
see supra notes 39-40.
66. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Johnson v.
Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Osland v.
Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987).
67. See, e.g., Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Other
jurisdictions where the courts had narrowly construed the statute of limitations in the absence
of a specific child molestation statute have since promulgated this type of statute, thereby
precluding future dismissals of such civil claims. For an overview of the cases, see supra note
25 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the relevant statutory enactments, see supra
note 39-40 and accompanying text.
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tations remains open.6"
Although Tyson has precedential value only in Washington, it provides a
backdrop for factually similar cases in other jurisdictions. In light of this,
many courts apply the reasoning of either the majority or minority in Tyson
to tort actions involving childhood sexual abuse.6 9 The present analysis fo-
cuses on two distinct classes70 of tort actions involving psychological injuries
arising from childhood sexual abuse. Type 1 cases are those in which the
plaintiff claims she knew about the sexual assaults at or before the age of
majority but was unaware of the causal connection between the prior sexual
abuse and her physical and psychological problems. 7 Type 2 cases are those
in which the plaintiff claims that the trauma of the experience caused her to
have no recollection of the sexual abuse until shortly before filing suit.72 A
brief overview of the cases reveals an even split on the disposition of type 1
cases,7 3 yet a more uniform approach to type 2 cases.74
68. Courts cited Tyson before it was superseded by the Washington legislature. See, e.g.,
DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (Ct. App. 1987); Meiers-Post, 427 N.W.2d at 609;
E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817, 820 (Mont. 1988); Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314, 317
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Courts citing Tyson after the Washington legislation was enacted
include Hildebrand, 763 F. Supp. at 1520; Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (Ct.
App. 1989); Lindabury, 552 So. 2d at 1120; Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 909.
69. There are many cases revealing similar fact patterns which are resolved through dif-
ferent approaches to the delayed discovery rule. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1987) (ruling that insanity will not extend the right to sue to twenty years after the incident);
Hildebrand, 763 F. Supp. 1512 (holding that fraudulent concealment will toll statute of limita-
tions if concealment is active and intentional in preventing plaintiff from obtaining information
as to the cause of action); Snyder v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding that post-traumatic syndrome developed during minority does not render vic-
tim "insane" so as to toll the statute of limitations); Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (holding that
"rediscovery" of repressed memories will not allow untimely suit to stand when complaint was
filed twenty years after the last acts of sexual abuse); State v. Bentley, 721 P.2d 227 (Kan.
1986) (threatening a child may constitute concealment so as to toll the statute of limitations);
E. W., 754 P.2d 817 (holding that statute of limitations was tolled until complainant reached
age of majority); Jones, 576 A.2d 316 (holding that insanity will toll statute of limitations).
70. These two classes, "type " and "type 2," were identified in Johnson, 701 F. Supp.
1363. While cases prior to Johnson had not referred to the suits as type 1 or type 2, for
purposes of this analysis such language will be substituted to provide a clearer distinction
between the two cases and their accompanying policy arguments.
Johnson was decided two years after Tyson; nonetheless, the Tyson court maintained that the
discovery rule does not apply to either class although no specific reference to such "types" was
made. See Tyson, 727 P.2d at 230.
71. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1367.
72. Id.
73. For example, California, Montana, and Washington courts have refused to apply the
discovery rule in type I cases. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987);
Snyder, 253 Cal. Rptr. 156; E. W., 754 P.2d 817; Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987). On the other hand, North Dakota and Wisconsin courts have applied the discov-
ery rule in type 1 cases. See Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v.
Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 623 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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A. Awareness of Childhood Sexual Assault
The disposition of type 1 cases relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the
ability of the victim to understand the nature of the wrongful conduct."
Courts disfavoring a delayed discovery rule in this context suggest that it is
irrelevant whether the psychological injuries are fully manifest before bring-
ing suit, 6 and that it is unnecessary for the victim to know the total extent
of her damages caused by the abusive act before the statute of limitations
begins to run.77 These courts have held that the victim's knowledge of the
wrongful act is sufficient to require inquiry into the cause of a subsequent
injury.7" Consequently, if a minor reaches the age of majority and becomes
aware of psychological problems caused by a childhood sexual abuse inci-
dent, such courts may decide that all pertinent facts are known and the
cause of action has accrued.79
These same courts advance certain policy considerations in refusing to
apply a delayed discovery rule.80 For example, in Raymond v. Ingram " the
plaintiff alleged that her paternal grandfather sexually abused her from the
time she was four until the time she was seventeen and that her paternal
74. Only one case has followed the rationale of Tyson in refusing to apply the delayed
discovery rule to type 2 cases, see Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989), while at least three courts have zealously opposed this approach. See Johnson, 701
F. Supp. 1363; Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Jones, 576
A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
Procedurally, type 2 cases present courts with an opportunity to address the issues at trial.
In such cases, the injury and its cause must both be recognized for a cause of action to accrue.
To establish those points in time for purposes of the statute of limitations, medical testimony is
offered to the court. In permitting this evidence, the court essentially acknowledges the trau-
matic impact that sexual abuse has on a child throughout her life and the need to provide a
tort remedy for adult survivors. See Salten, supra note 16, at 189. Medical testimony allows
the plaintiff to establish genuine issues of material fact and, therefore, precludes a summary
judgment motion. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Conversely, courts presiding over type 1 cases do not have the same opportunity because the
key element, the awareness of the sexual abuse, need not be demonstrated through medical
testimony because it has already been established by the victim herself. Therefore, type I cases
do not present the same need to admit extensive medical testimony on the victim's traumatic
experience.
75. See E. W., 754 P.2d at 820.
76. See id. at 818.
77. Raymond, 737 P.2d at 317.
78. E. W., 754 P.2d at 820.
79. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (Ct. App. 1987).
80. "To allow a plaintiff, who fails to inquire into the cause of an injury, to avoid the time
bar under the guise of 'discovery' would hopelessly demolish the protection afforded defend-
ants by the statute [of limitations]." Much v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 743, 745-
46 (D. Mont. 1980), aff'd, 685 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226,
227-28 (Wash. 1989).
81. 737 P.2d 314 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
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grandmother negligently allowed such abuse to continue.8 2 Plaintiff admit-
ted that, prior to therapy, "she remembered the assaults and realized that as
a child she had mental anguish associated with the sexual abuse." 3 The
court rejected the contention that her cause of action did not accrue until she
went to therapy and realized that her insomnia and stomach problems were
related to the earlier sexual abuse.84 Specifically, the court found that while
the causes of all her physical and psychological problems were not estab-
lished until therapy, she was previously aware that the sexual abuse caused
some type of injury.8" Consequently, the Raymond court held that "with
traumatic injury ... the cause of action accrues on that day, even if the full
extent of the injury is not known at that time."
8 6
The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of California addressed a simi-
lar issue in the 1987 case of DeRose v. Carswell.87 In DeRose, the plaintiff
alleged that her step-grandfather sexually abused her twenty years prior to
when the suit was filed. 8 She maintained that the action Was timely because
she did not understand the causal relationship between the alleged assaults
and her emotional injuries until the time she filed suit.8 9 The court dis-
agreed, expressly stating that the only time in which a delayed discovery rule
should be invoked is when the plaintiff has not discovered all of the facts
essential to the cause of action.9" In DeRose, the plaintiff was aware, at the
time of the assaults, of all the facts necessary to state a cause of action
against the defendant, as evidenced by her recollection that "at the times of
[the] said sexual molestation .... [she] felt great fear.., of his greater size
and strength and .. .his threats of harm."'" Therefore, the court barred
application of a delayed discovery rule.92
The court in DeRose conceded that there were situations in which aware-
ness of a wrongful act would not carry with it awareness of harm,93 but that
82. Id. at 315.
83. Id. at 317.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Lessee v. Union Pacific R.R., 690 P.2d 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)).
87. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
88. Id. at 369.
89. Id. at 370.
90. Id. at 371.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 372.
93. Id. at 371. The court preserved the issue of whether the delayed discovery rule may
be invoked when the plaintiff alleges that she repressed the memories of the sexual assault and
it is illogical to charge the plaintiff with awareness of the harm if she was unaware of the
assaults. Id.
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an assault was not one of them.94 Therefore, because there was knowledge
of the unconsented and offensive nature of defendant's acts, the court ruled
that the sexual assaults caused harm as a matter of law.9 5 The court found it
irrelevant that the plaintiff was unable to recognize the causal connection
between the assaults and the subsequent emotional harm.96
A similar type 1 case was argued under the premise that the adult victim's
insanity effectively tolls the statute of limitations for intentional torts. The
plaintiff in Smith v. Smith97 brought suit against her father alleging that he
repeatedly sexually abused her until she was twelve years old. 9' Medical and
psychological experts opined that the plaintiff was suffering from a post-
traumatic stress disorder, 99 which precluded her from instituting litigation
because of the potential to stimulate traumatic recall of the childhood
events."o° The applicable statute of limitations provided that a cause of ac-
tion be tolled based on insanity.'I ' It had been held by another court, how-
ever, that insanity under this disability provision does not apply to a person
"claiming a mere post traumatic neurosis,"102 and, therefore, is not a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. The court found that the victim was aware she had
94. Id. (citing Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie, 247 P.2d 133, 135 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952)).
95. DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
96. Id.
97. 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.. 1987).
98. Id. at 12.
99. In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association recognized this psychological trauma
can result from child sexual abuse. Harshaw, supra note 9, at 755. This anxiety disorder
features the
development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing event
that is outside the range of usual human experience .... There is often intense psy-
chological distress when the person is exposed to events that resemble an aspect of
the traumatic event .... In addition[,] .. .there is persistent avoidance of stimuli
associated with [the trauma] .... The person commonly makes deliberate efforts to
avoid thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event and about activities or situations
that arouse recollections of it. This avoidance of reminders of the trauma may in-
clude psychogenic amnesia for an important aspect of the traumatic event.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF DISOR-
DERS § 309.89 at 247-48 (3d rev. ed. 1987)[hereinafter DSM-III]. Consequently, it is common
for the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder to emerge after a latency period of months
or years following the trauma. Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988). A sexually abused child suffering from this disorder may repress or delay disclosing the
abuse until after the applicable statute of limitations for personal injury has run. Harshaw,
supra note 9, at 756. For a discussion of the victim's repression and accommodation of her
traumatic experience, see infra note 118.
100. Smith, 830 F.2d at 12.
101. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 208 (McKinney 1991).
102. See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1980).
Insanity, as defined within the respective tolling statutes, is evidently subject to judicial inter-
pretation. Cf infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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been sexually abused, the abuse had harmed her, the post-traumatic neurosis
which she suffered did not result from a separate and independent wrong,
and she was properly held to be time-barred by the statute of limitation." 3
The most recent evaluation of a type 1 case was by the Montana Supreme
Court in 1988.104 The plaintiff in E. W..v. D. C.H allegedly suffered seven
years of sexual attacks from the time she was five by her step-uncle, a close
family member.' 05 After her parents inadvertently discovered the abusive
incidents, medical examinations confirmed the sexual activity," 4 but the
possible psychological effects of the abuse were not addressed by the attend-
ing physician. 'O As a young adult, the plaintiff suffered emotional disor-
ders. '08 Subsequent psychiatric counseling, in connection with the second of
two divorces, indicated a possible causal connection between her ongoing
emotional problems and the childhood attacks." ° The court, however,
found it inappropriate to extend the discovery doctrine to instances of sexual
molestation when the plaintiff acknowledged that she "always knew" she
was molested as a child and suffered from psychological problems since late
adolescence. 1° Since the plaintiff was clearly aware of the wrongful con-
103. Smith, 830 F.2d at 12-13.
104. See E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988).
105. Id. at 818.
106. Id. Generally, if the parents fail to take action against known physical abuse, they
may be subject to criminal neglect charges. See J.E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Failure to Provide
Medical Attention for Child as Criminal Neglect, 12 A.L.R.2D 1047 (1950). Under extraordi-
nary circumstances, parental rights over the child may be terminated. Mary J. Cavins, Anno-
tation, Sexual Abuse of Child by Parent as Grounds for Termination of Parent's Right to Child,
58 A.L.R.3D 1075 (1974). In a number of cases, courts have found sufficient evidence to
justify termination of a parent's inherent right to control and care for his child where there has
been either sexual abuse of a child by the parent or aquiescence by the parent to such abuse.
See, e.g., In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 1988); In re Corrigan, 286 P.2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1955); In re Van Vlack, 185 P.2d 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); In re Armetrout, 485 P.2d
183 (1971); In re T.J.A., 407 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Baker v. Vidal, 363 S.W.2d 158
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962). A legal guardian also may have her guardianship rights terminated
under similar circumstances. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-101(b) (1991) (stating in its
declaration of policy that the state seeks to "compel in proper cases the parent or guardian of a
youth to perform the moral and legal duty owed to the youth") (emphasis added); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Baldwin Supp. 1991) (explaining that in addition to the natural par-
ents, the child endangering statute covers guardians and custodians, persons having temporary
control of a child, and persons standing in the place of parents). Additionally, some states
mandate the conditions and procedures under which the parent-child relationship may be ter-
minated, specifically where the child is considered neglected, deprived, or endangered. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 16-2001 to -2015 (1979 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-601
to -612 (1991). Under the Montana statute, the defendants in E. W could have been penalized
for criminal negelect if they had not protected the child from her abusive step-uncle.
107. E. W., 754 P.2d at 818.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 820.
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duct, her failure to fully understand her legal rights or the causal relation-
ship between the acts and her injuries was insufficient to toll the statute of
limitations. "'
Fundamental fairness considerations have caused other courts to follow
the Tyson dissent and apply the discovery rule in factually similar type 1
cases when protecting the defendant at the expense of the adult victim works
an "intolerable perversion of justice."' 1 2 These courts take into account
studies of victims of sexual assault explaining the psychological distress
caused by the abuse and the development of coping mechanisms," 3 which
render the victim unable to perceive or to know the existence or nature of
her psychological and emotional injuries." 4
In a case of first impression, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied a
delayed discovery rule in a type 1 case. In Hammer v. Hammer,1 5 the
plaintiff alleged that between 1969 and 1978 her father abused her on the
average of three times a week beginning at the age of five.'" 6 The abusive
incidents occurred in secret, were accompanied by harmful threats, and were
blamed on the plaintiff repeatedly by her abuser." 7 The court recognized
that both the acts themselves and the circumstances of the victim's child-
hood caused her to develop various coping mechanisms and symptoms of
psychological distress, including great shame, embarrassment, guilt, self-
blame, denial, depression, and disassociation from the experiences." 8
111. Id.
112. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Allen, supra
note 18, at 631).
113. Symptoms of psychological coping mechanisms include, but are not limited to, "great
shame, embarrassment, guilt, self-blame, denial, depression, disassociation from experiences,
and multiple personalities." Id. at 24; see also Phillips, supra note 1, at xiii-xvi. A child victim
deals with the emotionally overloading experience of repeated sexual abuse through such
processes, which essentially becomes a very functional means to survive. Phillips, supra note 1,
at xi, xiii.
114. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25. See also Carolyn Moore Newberger & Edward De Vos,
Abuse and Victimization: A Life-Span Developmental Perspective, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 505 (1988).
115. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. These are typical circumstances imposed by the abuser. See Allen, supra note 18,
at 614-15.
118. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 24. These are common psychological effects of sexual abuse.
See Allen, supra note 18, at 616; Virginia Cruz et al., Developmentally Disabled Women Who
Were Molested as Children, 1988 Soc. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 411; Kilgore,
supra note 19, at 224. Additionally, the victim of incest is forced to deal with the situation
alone when the other parental figure does not offer relief. Allen, supra note 18, at 615. For a
discussion of the mother's role in an incestuous family, see supra note 18.
Because the child must cope alone, she often internalizes her feelings of self-blame, anger,
fear, confusion, and sadness resulting from the incest. See Sandy Rovner, Healthtalk Facing
Childhood Sexual Abuse
The Hammer court relied on an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's psy-
chological counselor which declared that the plaintiff demonstrated a nor-
mal post-traumatic stress reaction to intrafamilial sexual abuse.119
According to the expert, the plaintiff was unable to perceive the incestuous
conduct as injurious because: 1) the long duration and frequency caused her
to perceive it as normal behavior; 2) secrecy and isolation had been imposed
upon her; 3) the abuse had essentially "depersonalized" her, leading her to
think of herself as an object to be used rather than a person with rights; 4)
she had been told by her abuser that such conduct was normal and his right;
and 5) the abuse by an authority figure on whom she was dependent made
her distrustful of other authority figures who might have helped her.
120
To establish when this cause of action accrued, the Hammer court carved
out an exception for cases of incestuous abuse involving minors and held it
"will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury." 121 Spe-
cifically, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff "had informa-
tion to a reasonable probability of the nature of her ailment and the factual
information to a reasonable probability that the defendant's... [act] was the
cause of her injuries." 122 Therefore, although some tort claims will accrue at
the time of the negligent act or the injury, an incestuous abuse claim may not
accrue until the victim had information as to the reasonable probability of
the Aftermath of Incest, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1984, at DS. This internalization or repression of
anger and anxiety is a survival mechanism known as accommodation. Salten, supra note 16, at
198.
Accomodation leads to dissociation, where the victim is prevented from recognizing the
nature and extent of the injuries she has suffered as a result of the incestuous abuse. Kilgore,
supra note 19, at 224, 227. Often, it is not until adulthood that a victim of sexual abuse as a
child will begin to exhibit signs of incest trauma. Although the victim may feel she is injured,
until she is able to place blame for the incest on her abuser, it is impossible for her to realize
that her abuser's behavior caused her psychological disorder. Frequently, it is only through a
triggering event such as psychotherapy that the victim is able to recognize the causal link
between the incestuous conduct and the damages to her from the traumatic experience. Allen,
supra note 18, at 630. Other triggering events have included a television program about the
sexual exploitation of students by a teacher, see Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986), and the presentation by an attorney, who herself was a victim, to a jury
in a factually similar case, see Carol L. Mithers, Incest and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. As demonstrated, awareness of the traumatic experience many
times does not occur until long after the wrongful acts were committed.
119. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25.
120. Id. Although the court did not cite to any secondary authority, other scholars have
acknowledged similar perceptions of these young victims. See Kilgore, supra note 19, at 224;
Newberger & De Vos, supra note 114, at 505.
121. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25-26 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 26 (quoting Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 388 N.W.2d 140, 151 (Wis. 1986)).
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the nature of her injuries and the cause thereof.123
B. Repressed Memories
The distinguishing feature between type 1 and type 2 cases is the plain-
tiff's awareness of the abuse.124 In type 2 cases, there is essentially no con-
scious memory of the abuse because of the psychological condition of the
victim subsequent to the abuse. 125 Consequently, courts approach type 2
cases cautiously. Adopting the approach taken by the dissent in Tyson, some
courts have made effective use of expert clinical testimony addressing the
psychological ramifications of sexual abuse on the adult victim. 126 These
cases often show that the adult victim is diagnosed as having post-traumatic
stress disorder. 127 The recognition of this psychological phenomena as man-
ifested through repression provides a stronger factual predicate for applying
the delayed discovery rule to type 2 cases. 128 Thus, a court no longer views
only the policy reasons for permitting a suit to be filed a substantial number
of years after the incident. Instead, the court is forced to analyze the impor-
tant diagnostic tools in psychotherapy as a crucial element in establishing
the existence of a cause of action based on a childhood event.
The lone case upholding the Tyson majority's refusal to apply a delayed
discovery rule with respect to type 2 cases denied an adult woman's action
against her parents for sexual battery. 129 In his dissenting opinion in Linda-
bury v. Lindabury, 3 o Judge Jorgenson expounds on the position that expert
medical testimony serves a useful purpose to both the courts and litigants
with respect to past events, thereby agreeing with the Tyson dissent.'3 ' The
123. Id. The Hammer court also provided a footnote asserting that even though an incest
victim may know that she has been injured, it is impossible for her to realize that her abuser's
behavior caused her psychological disorders until she is able to shift the blame for the abuse
from herself to her father. Id. at 26 n.7 (citing Allen, supra note 18, at 630).
124. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
125. Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
126. See, e.g., id. at 1365 (plaintiff's therapist diagnosed her as having multiple personality
disorder); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (non-treating
psychologist opined that childhood sexual abuse victims commonly suffer psychological
disabilities).
127. For a discussion of this psychological disorder in adults, see supra note 90. For a
general account of post-traumatic stress disorder in children, see Esther Deblinger et al., Post-
Traumatic Stress in Sexually Abused, Physically Abused, and Nonabused Children, 13 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 403 (1989).
128. See Jones, 576 A.2d at 319-20 (holding that plaintiff's allegations of mental impair-
ment caused by father's sexual abuse should not have been resolved summarily).
129. Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1118 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting). The dissent describes the difficulty of accepting
the premise that psychiatry offers precise and accurate determinations with regard to foresee-
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Lindabury dissent also offers .a perspective on how other courts in Florida
have treated expert testimony as an aid in determining the effects of other
psychological syndromes, such as battered wife syndrome, 132 rape trauma
syndrome,13 3 and post traumatic stress syndrome in child victims of sexual
assault, 134 concluding that expert testimony in childhood sexual abuse cases
should be treated similarly.13" Because a victim's reaction to these traumatic
episodes is unique among all forms of violent assault and because the com-
plexity of that reaction is beyond the understanding of the ordinary layper-
son sitting on a jury, expert testimony on the subject matter would assist the
trier of fact.136 The exact point in time when a victim comes to know, or
reasonably should have known, of her injury and that her injury was caused
by the wrongful acts of another is also unique to every victim of childhood
sexual assault because of the psychological trauma. Therefore, expert testi-
mony is necessary to help establish that point in time for statute of limita-
tions purposes.
1 37
Since 1988, three courts have favored application of a delayed discovery
rule in type 2 cases. In Jones v. Jones,138 the court relied on a psychologist's
affidavit to establish the commonality of psychological disability on the part
of a victim.139 The court ultimately held that the mental trauma resulting
from a pattern of incestuous sexual abuse may constitute insanity under the
respective state statute so as to toll the statute of limitations."4
In 1989, the Court of Appeal for Sixth District of California, the same
court which decided DeRose v. Carswell 4 only two years earlier, ruled fa-
vorably on the delayed discovery issue. Although the plaintiff in Mary D. v.
ability and future dangerousness but resolves the present issue in favor of using expert medical
testimony. Id. For a discussion on the accuracy of predicting future dangerousness, see Rob-
ert P. Miller, The Treating Psychiatrist as Forensic Evaluator in Release Decisions, 32 J. Fo-
RENSIC SCIENCES 481 (1987).
132. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Borders v. State,
433 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
133. See Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See
also People v. Reid, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984).
134. See Calloway v. State, 520 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Ward v. State, 519
So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986). See also State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277 (Kan. 1989). Unlike cases brought by adult
victims of incest as discussed throughout this Comment, these cases are criminal cases brought
against the abusers while the children are still minors, or soon thereafter.
135. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d at 1118-19 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1119 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1120 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
138. 576 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
139. Id. at 319.
140. Id. at 321.
141. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987). See supra text and accompanying notes 87-96.
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John D. 42 failed to present any psychiatric testimony corroborating her
claim that she repressed all memories of the abuse, 4 ' the court reversed the
grant of the summary judgment for the defendant and remanded to the
lower court. The court stated that it would allow the delayed discovery doc-
trine to apply if the plaintiff could establish that her lack of memory of the
tortious actions was due to psychological repression. 4"
Finally, in Johnson v. Johnson,1 4 which established the type 1 and type 2
distinction, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
when the adult plaintiff in a childhood sexual abuse case knew or should
have known of her injury and its wrongful cause. 146 The federal district
court, applying Illinois law, noted that courts in Illinois applied the discov-
ery rule in numerous contexts on a case-by-case basis. These decisions take
into account both the equitable considerations and problems of proof.1 47
The Johnson court concluded that the affidavit presented by the plaintiff's
therapist dispelled any problems of proof in her claim that she had no mem-
ory of the sexual abuse.' 48
Regardless of the lack of precedential value a dissent carries over a major-
ity opinion, courts have been reluctant to adhere to stringent majority opin-
ions like that offered in Tyson. 149 Consequently, more courts than not have
resolved these type 2 cases in favor of a delayed discovery rule. 5
II. UNIFORM APPROACH FOR EQUITABLE RESULTS
The prospect of avoiding such an inequitable result in granting a defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment in incestual abuse cases can be ad-
dressed either by the courts or by the legislature. Decisional law has the
capacity to maintain a uniform system of admitting clinical testimony as an
objective evaluation of the psychological development of the particular adult
victim, possibly in a manner analogous to the rules of evidence. Likewise,
the legislature has the ability to promulgate both a specific statute of limita-
tions which applies a liberal discovery rule to civil actions involving child-
142. 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989), reh'g denied, 800 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1990).
143. Id. at 635.
144. Id. at 639.
145. 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. 11. 1988).
146. Id. at 1370.
147. Id. at 1369-70.
148. Id. at 1370.
149. See, e.g., Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989). "We refuse to apply
the rationale of Tyson to this case. We agree with Justice Pearson, dissenting in Tyson, that
concern about the availability of objective evidence should not preclude application of the
discovery rule." Id.
150. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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hood sexual abuse and a criminal statute with no statute of limitations
defense for one accused of sexually abusing children. In these legislative
efforts, the policy concerns for allowing a civil action for childhood incestu-
ous abuse to overcome a statutory time restriction and for establishing an
unrestricted time period for prosecuting the child molester in the same inci-
dent and upon the same facts are the same.
The present method of allowing courts to determine the fate of these suits
based on their own sense of justice is not an equitable solution to this social
dilemma. As such, a moderate, logical approach to the problem should be
presented to all courts of general jurisdiction to allow the adult victim an
opportunity to convince a court or jury that there were genuine reasons that
she discovered or should have discovered her cause of action after it would
otherwise have been foreclosed by the statute of limitations.'5 This date of
discovery determination of psychological injuries should logically lie in the
hands of a person familiar with the victim's psychological conditions. Be-
cause of the nature of the victim's familial background" 2 and perhaps her
inability to actively participate in a relationship,' 53 the person most familiar
with the victim is a psychotherapist whom the victim confided in when no
one else was available.
154
While many scholars may skoff at the weight given to evidence developed
during psychotherapy,155 the nature of these cases provides very little in the
way of alternatives. The victim has psychologically repressed traumatic
events from her memory; 156 this psychological phenomenon should not pre-
clude her cause of action. To alleviate the skepticism, it is possible for the
courts to establish an objective administrative guideline to weigh the
151. In providing potential plaintiffs with the opportunity to bring suit after the statute of
limitations has passed, one state judge has proposed that the plaintiff's action be divided into
two distinct arguments. The plaintiff must prove first that the application of the discovery rule
is warranted in her case and, second, that she suffered injury, which was the result of child-
hood sexual abuse, and that the defendant was her abuser. See 31 ATLA L. REP. 389 (1988)
(citing Unnamed Plaintiff v. Unnamed Defendant, Mass., Suffolk County Superior Court, No.
confidential, June 21, 1988) (court files sealed except for Judge Abram's order and memoran-
dum opinion).
152. See supra note 18.
153. HERMAN, supra note 18, at 31-32.
154. Bryer et al., supra note 18, at 1430.
155. See generally Wesson, supra note 46. Despite such skepticism, the fact remains that it
is the function of the jury to determine the weight of expert testimony once the issue reaches
the trial level. Additionally, testimony of a psychoanalyst is essential prior to the trial-to
assist the judge in determining whether application of the delayed discovery rule is appropriate
under the circumstances of the case. For this reason, it becomes necessary to consider a stan-
dard weight that expert testimony should be given by the court in this preliminary matter.
156. See supra notes 99 and 118 and accompanying text.
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credence of the psychiatric expert.'57 Skeptics of psychoanalysis also con-
template the various transformations that separate the historical truth from
the psychoanalytic truth, or rather what really happened and what the psy-
chotherapist has interpreted to have happened. 5 8 Because of the possibility
that, in the process of talking with the patient about her memory, the thera-
pist may unintentionally supply a phrase or description 159 which the patient
may incorporate into her private experience,eo the implications of psychoa-
nalysiscmay be viewed as a construction-rather than a reconstruction-of
the past events.' 6' Consequently, it may be necessary to present a neutral
third party evaluation of the adult victim's mental condition. In essence,
this could be a court appointed neutral expert who is theoretically an "ex-
pert on psychological experts," capable of evaluating the long-term clinical
treatment of an adult victim of childhood sexual abuse.' 6
2
The legislature's role in relieving the potential inter-jurisdictional, as well
as possible intra-jurisdictional, discrepancies of these otherwise untimely
cases may have a very persuasive impact on the policy arguments of victims
of childhood sexual abuse. Within the last three years, legislatures across
the country have begun to recognize an adult victim's right to bring a civil
action against her abuser without regard to the long period of time between
the wrongdoing and the suit.'6 ' This widespread acknowledgment of previ-
ously inadequate remedies for childhood sexual assault victims was initially
set in motion by Patti Barton, a thirty-five-year-old victim of sexual assault
157. This theoretical framework is presented in Kilgore, supra note 19. Kilgore recognizes
that sexual abuse is uncovered in the latent context presented during traditional therapy and
the potential that this evidence provides in understanding the associated features of sexual
abuse. The article attempts to fill the gaps between understanding these descriptive findings
and predicting and applying those findings to clinical practice. Kilgore, supra note 19. In
particular, the article integrates the most recent literature on the characteristics of early child-
hood sexual abuse and its victims with theories of ego-development psychology. Therefore,
courts must understand the effects of childhood sexual abuse on social and emotional develop-
ment of the victim before judging her action as inexuasably untimely.
158. Wesson, supra note 46, at 335-38.
159. This is an element of "countertransference," which is affected by the therapist's own
psychodynamic process. The analyst is bound on occasion to hear a production in a certain
way because it fits into his or her own preconceived interpretation of what happened in the
patient's past. See id. at 336.
160. This is labeled "transference," the feelings that a patient has about the analyst. For
example, the patient may embellish a vague or elusive memory of childhood with the expecta-
tion of pleasing the analyst with a detailed description. See id.
161. Id. at 335-38.
162. See generally Stephen E. Willis & Ronnie D. Homer, Attitudes, Experience, and
Knowledge of Family Physicians Regarding Child Sexual Abuse, 25 J. FAM. PRAC. 516 (1987)
(examining knowledge, attitudes, and experiences of family physicians regarding child sexual
abuse).
163. For specific legislation enacted, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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that began when she was five. 1" With the legal assistance of the Seattle-
based Northwest Women's Law Center (Law Center), Patti Barton and her
husband succeeded in creating the first piece of state legislation in the coun-
try to amend the statute of limitations to provide a delayed discovery rule to
traumatized victims of childhood sexual abuse.
165
Agencies and organizations throughout the country have supported legis-
lative efforts as well. 166 A prime example is the efforts outside of Washing-
ton by the Law Center and Bartons' newly formed group, the Legal Rights
for Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse.' 67 Even within the state of Wash-
ington, lobbying efforts have afforded these organizations the opportunity to
proclaim that "the discovery rule is particularly well-suited to cases involv-
ing childhood sexual abuse."' 68 Supporters of this discovery rule are seeking
to end the unfair protection afforded the abuser and instead force him to face
the victim when she is an adult and able to stand up for herself. By permit-
ting the victim to sue when she discovers the injury and its cause, it is more
likely that abusers will eventually be held accountable to pay, and ultimately
there will be a decline in the incidence of childhood sexual assault.
169
The criminal side of childhood sexual assault is closely related to the
delayed discovery issue in civil actions. Sexual assault and child molestation
assault have been recognized as crimes in the United States since the early
164. For a brief discussion of the reasons leading to her participation in the legislative
arena, see supra note 39.
165. See Mithers, supra note 118, at 58.
166. In addition to lobbying efforts, agencies from Massachusetts to California have taken
the side of many adult victims bringing civil actions against their abusers in cases of first
impression. For example, a Rhode Island trial court's application of a delayed discovery rule
to allow two sisters to maintain a civil suit against their father was upheld by that state's
Supreme Court. Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991). Twenty-six private organizations
and state agencies joined in filing a friend-of-the-court brief. See generally Br. of Amici Cu-
riae, Doe v. Marc LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991) (No. 90-97). These include, for in-
stance, the National Organization for Women, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, the State of Connecticut Commission on Victim Services, the National
Association of Social Workers, the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,
and the Rhode Island Office of the Child Advocate. Paul E. Parker, 26 Agencies Back Sisters'
Suit Against Father Accused of Rape, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 22, 1990, at B3.
167. For example, in April, 1989, the Bartons testified before the Alaska House Judiciary
Committee in support of similar legislation. Lund, supra note 39. They have also provided
extensive background information to Rhode Island legislators seeking to enact a delayed dis-
covery rule. Letter from Kelly and Patti Barton to Representative Batastini (Apr. 22, 1989)
(responding to the latter's request for compiled materials used in support of Washington
legislation).
168. Memorandum from Py Bateman of "Alternatives to Fear" to the Washington legisla-
ture 6-7 (Jan. 1, 1988) (on file with author) (citing Surgeon General's Northwest Regional
Conference on Interpersonal Violence (Sept. 12, 1987)).
169. Shirley Feldman-Summers, Summary of Testimony Presented to Washington State
Legislature (1988).
1992]
332 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:309
1800s. 17 ° State legislatures have the capacity to determine the applicable
statutory time limit on bringing such criminal actions against a defendant.' 7 '
If child molestation and sexual abuse crimes have no statute of limita-
tions,17 2 prosecution of such crimes can occur years or even decades after
the incidents took place. Thus, this lack of statutes of limitations relating to
criminal acts similarly disfavors limiting the time in which an action for the
tortious injuries of sexual abuse can be brought in a civil action involving the
same incident.
Forty states, however, currently do impose limitations on criminal prose-
cution. 173 States which maintain statutes of limitations for rape, child sexual
abuse, 174 and incest,'17 and recognize the date on which to toll the statute,
essentially have accepted the same policy reasons for providing a discovery
rule in civil actions. For instance, legislators have begun to realize that the
relationship between the powerful, authoritarian adult offender and the help-
less, dependent child victim makes reporting such abuse highly unlikely. 176
In these states, the statute of limitations is tolled until the victim reaches a
170. Jessica E. Mindlin, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of Limitations: A Model
for Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV., 189, 194 (1990).
171. Twenty-four states impose a statute of limitations for child sexual abuse, yet do not
provide statutory or common law provisions for tolling the criminal statute. They are: Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at 191 n. 12.
The following nine states have no limitation period for felony offenses, including child mo-
lestation: Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In fact, Wyoming and South Carolina have no statute of
limitations for any criminal offense. Id. at nn.13-14.
Still, 16 other states have specifically addressed child sexual assault crimes by mandating
that the limitations period for these crimes does not begin to run until: 1) the offense is discov-
ered; 2) the child victim reaches a minimum age; or 3) the abuse is reported to a law enforce-
ment agency. These states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at n. 15.
172. For a list of nine states with no applicable time limitation, see id. at n. 14.
173. See id. at nn.12, 15.
174. State legislatures are expanding the definition of "sexually abusive behavior" in an
effort to criminalize more harmful conduct, recognizing the power imbalance between offend-
ers and child victims. See id. at 195. For example, such offenses now include an assailant who
abuses his position of authority to coerce the victim into an abusive relationship. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(1)(b) (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie Supp.
1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.093(l) (West Supp. 1991).
175. Incest has been held to fall within a charge of rape. D.H. Webster, Annotation, Incest
as Included Within Charge of Rape, 76 A.L.R.2D 484 (1961). Where applicable, a rape prose-
cution will be held to include the more specific charge of incest if the latter is not addressed
otherwise.
176. Mindlin, supra note 170, at 195 n.33, 197.
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certain age, 177 but the victim is still required to report the assault within the
statutory time period, leaving intimidated victims very little protection from
such traumatizing crimes.
178
On the other hand, some state legislatures have been creative in tolling the
statute of limitations under particular circumstances. 179 For example, the
prescribed time period within which a suit must be commenced may not
include any time in which the fact of the crime is concealed,' 80 particularly
when the accused person has concealed evidence of the crime and other evi-
dence sufficient to charge him with the offense is unknown or can not be
attained by the prosecuting authorities in the exercise of due diligence.' In
interpreting such statutes, courts have construed this exception to the statu-
tory time period in two very different ways. For instance, Kansas courts
have held that a defendant who threatens and compels a victim not to reveal
the crime to anyone does not constitute concealment for purposes of tolling
the statute of limitations. 1 2 The reasoning behind such a holding is that
although sexual abuse of children by its nature occurs in secrecy, the victim
herself knew that the crime had been committed as soon as it occurred and,
therefore, the crime was not concealed. 18 3 However, the language of the
court's opinion in State v. Bentley ' 4 reveals that the majority of the Kansas
Supreme Court was unlikely to extend the statute of limitations beyond the
stated two-year period in any case.' 8 5
177. The ages in the respective states vary. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-1-109(h) (Michie
Supp. 1991) (tolled until the victim reaches 18); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-401(7) (1986 &
Supp. 1991) (age of 15); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(7) (West Supp. 1991) (age of 16); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-6(c) (Smith-Hurd 1989) (age of 18); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
277, § 63 (West Supp. 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:1-6-b(4) (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-1-9.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5554(3) (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 939.74(c) (West 1990); see also Mindlin, supra note 170, at 191-92 n.15.
178. Mindlin, supra note 170, at 195.
179. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-2 (Burns 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN § 21-3106
(1988).
180. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(4)(c) (1988).
181. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-2(d)(2) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1991).
182. See State v. Miller, 722 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Bentley, 721
P.2d 227, 230 (Kan. 1986).
183. Bentley, 721 P.2d at 230.
184. 721 P.2d 227 (Kan. 1986).
185. The opinion reads in pertinent part:
Threats... are an effective way to keep child victims from reporting sexual offenses.
They are commonplace in the aftermath of a sexual assault on a child. Therefore, the
practical effect of construing a threat to a sexually abused child as concealment
would be to extend the statute of limitations beyond its stated two-year period in




334 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:309
The dissent in Bentley maintains that a young, naive, horrified victim does
not "necessarily know" that the acts of a trusted adult constitute a crime
punishable at law18 6 and, therefore, any action by the accused designed or
calculated to prevent discovery of the crime is "concealment."'' 8 7 When the
effects of sexual abuse on a child are considered, 8 ' it becomes apparent that
this latter rationale is appropriate in these criminal prosecutions. Courts
which do not follow Bentley undoubtedly offer a more just solution to con-
struing "concealment of a crime.' 9 Additionally, if courts interpret this
concealment fairly, they will employ the same reasoning for allowing appli-
cation of the discovery rule for civil actions involving sexual abuse in which
the personal injury is psychologically concealed or repressed from the plain-
tiff"9° just as the malicious crime is concealed from authorities.
The rationale for prescribing sexual abuse as a criminal offense can be
used for the related civil action as well. The evidence and witnesses in the
criminal action are the same as in the civil action and, therefore, both actions
should be on equal footing with regard to the statutory time limit in which
to file an action. Until such time as a specific tort of incest is recognized by
enacting a statute of limitations for such a tort, courts should adopt the
policy considerations of the analogous criminal statute of limitations for the
offensive act.
III. CONCLUSION
The latent nature and psychologically crippling effects of many incest-re-
lated injuries present unusual problems to courts adjudicating tort claims
arising from these childhood events. However, the nearly epidemic propor-
tions of sexual abuse incidents demonstrates the urgency in addressing these
serious acts. A tort action for incestuous injuries detected later in the vic-
tim's life is perhaps the paradigmatic example of the special circumstances
which require equitable preservation of a potential remedy.
Since medical professionals have called public attention to the traumatic
effects of childhood sexual abuse, it is unreasonable to deny a plaintiff the
right to present this evidence on behalf of discovery principles. Such discov-
186. Id. at 231; see also Walstrom v. State, 752 P.2d 225, 228 (Nev. 1988).
187. Bentley, 721 P.2d at 231.
188. See supra notes 18 and 118.
189. See, e.g., Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (Ind. 1988) (where the victim and her
sister had not told anyone of repeated attacks upon them by their father because he threatened
to "put them in the hospital," the defendant successfully concealed facts of his crimes by
intimidating his victims and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
victim made her disclosure to authorities).
190. For a discussion of the psychological repression, see supra notes 98 and 118.
1992] Childhood Sexual Abuse 335
ery principles should provide all plaintiffs similarly situated with the prece-
dential benefit of a successful claim. However, unless a uniform approach to
the discovery rule is established, plaintiffs will face a difficult, if not impossi-
ble, obstacle of an extremely short statutory time limit. To permit judges to
continue to apply different discovery rule principles across the country or to
refuse to implement a statute of limitations for specific sexual abuse acts
advocates public ignorance of this serious and troublesome problem.
Kristin E. Rodgers

